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I. Introduction 
 Commercial banking is a substantial industry 
with over 5,000 commercial banks in the United States. 
An important feature of a bank’s activity is lending for 
different purposes. Different types of loans distributed 
by banks are crucial to propel an economy forward. My 
research focuses on the commercial banking industry in 
the Midwest region of the United States. Specifically, I 
will examine Illinois (IL), Indiana (IN), Iowa (IA), 
Kansas (KS), Kentucky (KY), Michigan (MI), 
Minnesota (MN), Missouri (MS), Ohio (OH), and 
Wisconsin (WI). In 2013, these 10 states together 
housed 2,446 of the 5,865 banks in the nation, which is 
42% of the nation’s total banks. Specifically, this paper 
will analyze how regional economic indicators and 
bank-specific indicators impact commercial and 
industrial (C&I) loans. Analyzing C&I loans is relevant 
because understanding the underlying factors that affect 
C&I lending is important from a bank’s risk 
management perspective. 
 Generally, banks’ assets include relatively safe, 
liquid assets such as government securities. However, 
banks also have illiquid assets, such as loans. Banks 
make various types of loans: C&I, real estate, 
agricultural, and individual. These less liquid assets earn 
more income but are inherently more risky. Within the 
different categories of loans, C&I loans are among the 
riskier types of loans. 
 Examining C&I loans and their relationship 
with local economic indicators is important because 
business cycles impact the banking sector, and 
hence, bank lending. An example of this is the most 
recent financial crisis in the United States. Koepke 
(2011) notes that the shocks the banking sector saw 
 
in the financial crisis were “historically unprecedented” 
(p. 168). Given that the banking sector had not been 
exposed to this magnitude of a recession before, it is 
critical to examine the causes of this recession and 
potential ways the banking sector can recover. 
 Currently, the banking sector is in the process 
of recovering from the recent financial crisis. The 
recovery is evidenced by a report noting competition for 
C&I loans is “fierce” (Stewart, 2014). This is positive 
news for the overall economy. Increased competition 
can have two implications. The first is that there is an 
increase in the number of loans being made. The second 
is competition may be fierce because banks are lending 
less in an attempt to recover funds lost during a 
financial crisis.  
 Previewing the results of my research, I find 
that real state GDP growth, real personal income 
growth, bank return on assets (ROA), credit quality of a 
bank’s assets, and the capital-to-assets ratio have an 
impact on real C&I loans. All significant variables have 
a positive relationship with real C&I loans except for 
the capital-to-assets ratio, which negatively affected 
C&I loans.  
 This paper continues with a literature review in 
section II. Then, the theory is discussed in section III, 
followed by the data in section IV, and the hypothesis in 
section V. Next, section VI introduces the empirical 
model, and section VII discusses the results. Lastly, the 
paper is concluded in section VIII with consideration of 
policy implications from this research and avenues for 
future research. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 There are currently multiple arenas of the 
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banking sector that are heavily studied. I focus on 
reviewing ideas central to commercial bank lending. 
Much of the literature discusses the cyclical compo- 
nent of bank lending. There are views and literature   
that support both sides of cyclicality—that lending     
can be procyclical as well as counter-cyclical.  Dages 
(2000) explains the reasoning for both sides of the 
argument. He claims that transaction based lend-       
ing, a lending practice in which banks focus on           
the hard facts of a loan and not the borrower, drive 
lending patterns to be procyclical. This is because   
better economic conditions provide opportunities        
for expanding one’s business, and more loans are     
both demanded and supplied (p. 20). Along with an 
expansion driving businesses to demand loans, when  
the economy is expanding, the numbers always look 
better and loans seem less risky to banks. This is why 
transaction lending encourages procyclical behavior. 
The second type of lending Dages (2000) notes is 
relationship lending. Dages (2000) states that lend-     
ing levels are counter-cyclical when banks focus on 
relationship lending. Relationship lending is when 
banks focus on the individual relationships they have 
and make lending decisions based more heavily on      
the previous lending encounters they have had with   
said borrower. In this case, Dages (2000) points out   
that banks use lending to help established custom-     
ers, “smooth over the effects of cyclical fluctuations    
or consumption” (p. 20). Therefore, when the busi-   
ness cycle is contracting, lending increases to offset    
the negative economic condition being experienced     
by businesses. On the other hand, during expan-     
sions, borrowers pay back the loans taken during the 
downturn rather than taking on more loans. Because   
the number of loans made during expansions shrinks, 
lending is counter-cyclical. While the author provides 
explanations for both, the majority of the literature    
does not support Dages’ counter-cyclical relation-    
ship lending theory. Rather, it focuses on lending as a 
procyclical variable.  
 When describing why lending is procycli-             
cal, literature offers a few different explanations. The 
first and most prevalent comes from Athanasoglou 
(2014), and relates to the efficient market hypothesis. 
The efficient market hypothesis states that borrowers 
and lenders are all privy to the same information in 
markets, and all individuals make rational investment 
decisions based on that information. Therefore, banks 
make loans having a full set of information. The same 
goes for borrowers—when they take out a loan, they 
have a full set of information. The efficient market 
hypothesis suggests, then, that both lenders and 
borrowers have the same information sets and 
make/borrow loans trusting and knowing the same 
present and future economic conditions.                     
The ideas presented thus far allude to the notion        
that banks play a role in driving the business cycle. 
Athanasoglou (2014) says the main reason for procy-
clicality in variables related to the banking sector is 
deviations from the efficient market hypothesis. Later   
in his article, Athanasoglou (2014) also gives atten-  
tion to the efficiency of banks in the market. He built 
upon the idea of banks driving the business cycle by 
writing that, “during the upward phase of the cycle,        
. . . loans are granted to investments with marginally 
positive or even a negative net present value” (p. 64). 
By making loans that banks would not have normally 
made, or certainly would not have made during a 
contraction, they are encouraging the expansion           
of the business cycle. On the contrary, when banks 
conservatize their lending agenda during recessions,     
it emphasizes the economic slowdown, which accen-
tuates the negative impacts of a contraction.  
 In credit markets, rather than having equal 
information sets, borrowers and lenders are subject       
to asymmetric information. As noted above, Atha-
nasoglou (2014) claims asymmetric information is     
the strongest cause of procyclicality (p. 61). Further,    
he noted borrowers have the upper hand in regard to 
knowledge about a loan (Athanasoglou 2014). This is 
because borrowers are able to withhold information/ 
their concerns from a bank when applying for a loan. 
And, when banks practice transactional lending they 
support procyclicality. So, banks are mostly focused   
on the numbers of the loan rather than the personal 
details. Overall, asymmetric information in favor of   
the borrower leads to banks making more loans when 
the numbers appear better in an expansion, and fewer 
loans in a contraction. These tendencies are what    
drive the procyclical nature of bank lending. 
 Along with positive economic conditions   
influencing banks to lend more, Athanasoglou (2014) 
suggests that a bank’s competition also has an influ-
ence on their lending decisions. While I am not ac-
counting for fellow bank competition in my project, 
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I am noting it here as it is discussed in the literature. 
Bank competition pairs with positive economic con-
ditions and urges banks to lend more in good eco- 
nomic times. For example, if a bank were considering 
tapering their lending because they were lending too 
aggressively, the actions of their competition would 
most likely make that decision for them. Athanaso-  
glou (2014) writes, “bank managers and large insti-
tutional investors tend to follow their competitors, 
therefore adding to the market volatility” (p. 61). So,   
the more each bank increases (decreases) lending in    
an expansion (contraction), the more those decisions 
dissipate throughout the local banking sector, and the 
more pronounced the business cycle becomes. 
 A separate idea presented in the literature is          
that single-market banks react differently to regional 
economic changes than multi-market banks do. Prior    
to the financial crisis, single-market banks were very 
common. However, since 2007, over 500 banks have 
failed. This means that over 500 banks have closed or 
were bought out by a larger bank. The buying of small 
banks by larger banks has led to the presence of      
more multi-market banks than there were prior to the 
financial crisis. The increase in multi-market banks    
has created new trends for the banking sector and its 
reactions to regional economic shocks. 
 Keeton (2009) explains that studying how         
multi-market banks react to changes in regional 
economic indicators is relevant, because for local 
communities, a change in bank performance, “affects 
the volatility of [the community’s output and employ-
ment]” (p. 5). But, the effects of bank performance do 
not stop there. Not only does bank performance have 
local impacts, but also Keeton (2009) notes that the, 
“distribution of credit across markets can affect over-  
all productivity and growth” (p. 5). Therefore, a shift   
to multi-market banking has impacts on a greater 
number of geographical locations due to banks being 
integrated in multiple markets. 
 In regard to the sensitivity of multi-market 
banks compared to single-market banks, Keeton   
(2009) finds multi-market banks are not as sensi-       
tive to changes in local economic indicators. Being 
involved in multiple markets does not allow banks to  
be as in tune with local economic conditions. When       
a bank is only involved in one market, they are, for 
the most part, only greatly impacted by changes in 
supply and demand in that area. However, multi-   
market banks are impacted by changes in economic 
conditions in multiple areas. Therefore, they may not  
be fully aware of each market they are in and how it     
is doing economically. In general, it is expected that 
multi-market banks will be less sensitive to changes     
in the business cycle compared to single-market    
banks. 
 Multi-market banking brings new charac-
teristics to the supply of loanable funds. In a single-
market bank, if loan performance decreases, lending 
levels also decrease. However, if loan performance 
decreases for a multi-market bank, the bank may        
not have to immediately decrease lending levels to 
account for poor loan performance. Rather, multi-
market banks may be able to pull funds from another 
market they are in that is faring well and supplement  
the need in the bank with poor loan performance.    
Being able to do this allows the supply of loanable 
funds for multi-market banks to be less responsive, or 
more inelastic, to local economic shocks compared to 
single-market banks (Keeton 2009). A similar reac-  
tion is seen with demand side shocks.                         
Prior to multi-market banking, if the demand for     
loans decreased, single-market banks had to either 
adjust their interest rate to spur lending or hold tight 
until demand increased. However, if a multi-market 
bank experiences a decrease in demand in one of      
their markets, there is not as comprehensive of an    
effect on the bank as a whole. Because multi-market 
banks are diversified in location, one market per-
forming poorly can be outweighed or neutralized         
by another market performing well (Keeton 2009). 
Overall, multi-market banking causes banks to be less 
reactive to localized economic shocks. 
 Berrospide and Keeton (2013) discuss these 
new trends and build upon Keeton’s previous work. 
They assign the new trends the substitution effect      
and the spillover effect. In a culminating statement, 
Berrospide (2013) notes, “multi-market banks should 
reduce local lending less than single-market banks in 
response to adverse local loan supply shocks” (p. 2). 
While Keeton’s earlier work agrees with this state-  
ment, Berrospide (2013) concludes with a different   
idea for demand shocks. Berrospide (2013) claims that 
in a contraction, “multi-market banks should 
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curve is labeled D. The value on the x-axis represents 
the quantity of funds loaned, and the y-axis shows the 
interest rate that quantity of loans is loaned at. The 
supply and demand interact in the market to reach an 
interest rate where the quantity demanded equals the 
quantity supplied. I expect the supply of C&I loans      
to move in a procyclical manner. During economic 
expansions, households have more funds to put aside 
and save, so the level of deposits in the bank increas-  
es. The increase in available funds and the increase in 
demand for C&I loans causes the amount of dollars 
supplied in C&I loans to increase as well.  
 These assumptions are supported by Keeton’s 
(2009) research. In regard to the procyclicality of the 
demand for C&I loans, he asserts that during con-
tractions, business activity decreases (p. 15). Because  
of the decrease in revenue and income, businesses     
will not be in a financial situation to demand C&I  
loans. In regard to supply, Keeton (2009) concludes 
economic contractions are associated with lower em-
ployment levels and income (p. 16). This supports the 
assumption that deposit levels will decrease during 
contractions. Lower employment and income levels 
mean individuals do not store as much money in a 
savings account, so deposits decrease. The decrease in 
deposits decreases the supply of loanable funds. 
IV. Hypothesis 
 My research focuses on the impacts that re-
gional economic indicators and bank-specific vari-  
ables have on C&I loans. Overall, I hypothesize that 
C&I loans made by commercial banks are procyclical 
and sensitive to changes in state GDP and personal 
income growth rates, state HPI, state unemployment 
rates, the real loan rate, bank ROA, credit quality,      
and capital-to-asset ratio. An economic expansion     
will result in an increase in C&I loans. Further, an 
increase in the overall health of the bank or economy,  
or a decrease in a bank’s capitalization will also result 
in an increase in C&I loans. 
V. Data Description 
5.1. Variables Description and Preliminary Diagnos- 
tics 
  This research analyzes the effects of both re-
gional economic indicators and bank specific indica- 
tors on the level of C&I lending in the 10 Midwestern 
states of Illinois, Iowa, Indiana, Kentucky, Kansas, 
reduce local lending more than single-market banks”   
(p. 2). He grounds these assertions in the spillover     
and substitution effects. The spillover effect captures 
supply side changes. These are changes in lending         
a bank makes in region B due to adverse economic 
conditions in region A. The spillover effect says that     
if region A is experiencing negative economic condi-
tions, banks will reduce lending in that region and 
increase lending in region B, given region B is not 
experiencing adverse economic conditions. Next,       
the substitution effect says that if there is a negative 
demand shock in one region, banks will substitute 
lending in other sectors and pull out of the poorly 
performing sector. These ideas are examples of new 
trends being seen with the increase in multi-market 
banking. While I am not controlling for multi-market 
versus single-market in my research, it is an area that 
future research may want to delve into as multi-mar-  
ket banks are becoming more and more prevalent. 
 
III. Theory  
 The theory being used for this research is       
the loanable funds theory (Abel 2011). The loanable 
funds theory states that the amount of loans supplied 
and the funds saved by households to fund those     
loans find an equilibrium quantity and interest rate in 
the market for loanable funds. Firms requiring funds  
for capital expenditure and/or research and develop-
ment (R&D) are the demanders for loanable funds. In 
this research, the demand will represent the demand   
for C&I loans. I expect the demand for C&I loans        
to move in a procyclical fashion. The healthier the 
economy, the more businesses invest in expanding, 
R&D, etc. 
 
 The supply of loanable funds comes from 
households that put their funds into a savings ac-     
count at a bank. In other words, the supply is the    
dollar amount of deposits in the bank that banks can 
loan. Banks then use the funds being saved by house-
holds to make loans to firms that want to borrow. In   
this research, the supply curve represents the aggre-  
gate dollar amount supplied in C&I loans. Figure 1 
shows the graphical framework for the loanable funds 
theory. 
 
 The supply line is labeled S and the demand 
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Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, and Wiscon-   
sin. The dependent variable in this study is Commer- 
cial & Industrial (C&I) loans. These loans are a type    
of loans banks make, and they are the riskiest. As not- 
ed in the Literature Review, C&I loans have a cycli-   
cal component to them. Further, they are influenced    
by the business cycle and condition of the banking 
sector. Because this research is analyzing how both 
regional economic indicators and overall bank health 
impact C&I loans, there are multiple economic and 
banking variables used. 
 The regional economic indicators included      
in this study are state GDP growth, personal income 
growth, state HPI, and state unemployment rate. State 
GDP growth and personal income growth are used as 
proxies for local business cycles. State GDP growth 
measures the yearly increase or decrease in state     
GDP. Personal income growth measures the yearly 
growth in household incomes in each state. The HPI     
is a measure of housing prices in each state, and state 
unemployment rates capture the unemployed popula-
tion as a share of the labor force in each state. Along 
with regional variables, state-level, bank-specific vari-
ables are also used in this research and are addressed 
next.  
 The bank-specific variables in this study are 
bank return on assets (ROA), credit quality, and cap-
ital-to-asset ratio. A bank’s ROA is a measure of bank 
profitability. It measures the return banks get on their 
assets, i.e. how efficiently a bank’s management gener-
ates revenue from the bank’s assets. A higher ROA 
means banks are making more profit, and a lower   
ROA means banks are making less profit.  Credit 
quality is calculated by dividing the total provision     
for bad loans and leases by total loans. It captures the 
quality of banks’ credit as well as credit risk. A higher 
credit quality means banks are making poorer quality, 
riskier loans. Lastly, the capital-to-assets ratio is cal-
culated by dividing total equity capital by total assets. 
This ratio shows a bank’s capital as a share of total as-
sets. More capitalized banks are considered safer and 
less risky, and hence are more credit worthy. 
 I acquired all relevant data from multiple 
sources. Each variable was collected at the state level 
for each of the ten states included in the study. First,      
I collected the data for the variables representing the 
overall banking industry in each state from the FDIC 
website . Bank ROA is of annual frequency from    
1966-2013. To calculate credit quality I downloaded   
the provision for loan and lease losses and total loans. 
They are annual frequency and range from 1967-    
2013. Calculating the capital-to-asset ratio required 
downloading banks’ total equity capital and total as- 
sets. Again, they span from 1966-2013. 
 For regional economic indicators, I used the  
US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) for state        
GDP. This data are also annual frequency ranging   
from 1966-2013. Next, I downloaded unemployment 
rates from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
Again, the data are annual frequency, but range from 
1976-2013. State HPI was found on the US Federal 
Home Finance Agency (FHFA) website in annual 
frequency for the years 1975-2013. After download-  
ing these variables, I put them into real terms using    
the national CPI (sourced from the BLS). I used 2009  
as the base year and converted all values into 2009    
CPI values. This will allow accurate comparison of 
changes in the variables over time by accounting for 
inflation. The bank prime loan rate is the interest rate 
banks charge on loans to businesses. It was sourced 
from the U.S. Federal Reserve Board website and was 
adjusted for inflation to express it in real terms. A 
summary of these variables, their description, and 
source are summarized below in Table 1.                 
Figure 2 shows the total dollar amount loaned in C&I 
loans for the years 1966-2013 for all ten states com-
bined. 
 The greatest drop in the inflation-adjusted    
C&I loans occurred during the financial crisis around 
2008. As can be seen in the recession in the late    
1980’s and early 1990’s, a recession brings about a 
decrease of some magnitude in the level of C&I loans. 
However, the magnitude of the decrease in C&I loans 
during 2008 is much greater than the decrease in the 
late1980s-early1990s recession, signaling the most re-
cent crisis had a larger impact on C&I lending in the 
Midwest. Figure 3 plots the overall ROA for all banks 
in these 10 states. An ocular view shows the dramatic 
decline in the overall health of banks in the ten-state 
region during the financial crisis is easily noted by     
the dramatic dip around 2008. This graph shows how 
bank profits declined during the last financial crisis as 
well as during the banking crisis of the late 1980s-ear- 
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ly 1990s. And, as with lending levels, the magnitude    
of decrease in bank ROA in the recent crisis was far 
greater than any other decrease in the series. Nota-    
bly, in year 2009 banks in these 10 Midwestern states 
had negative ROA, which means they suffered losses. 
Table 2 shows the average values for all variables in 
each state from 1966-2013. 
 Overall, each state in the Midwest region has 
relatively similar values for the variables being ana-
lyzed. This shows each state was in a relatively similar 
economic condition throughout the years 1966-2013. 
Ohio has the greatest average C&I loans at $70.89 
million, and Kansas has the lowest with $5.52 mil-   
lion. In regard to state GDP growth, Minnesota has     
the highest growth rate (2.62%), and Michigan has     
the lowest (1.092%). For overall bank heath, Illinois 
banks have the lowest ROA ratio value (0.007) and 
there is a three-way tie between Kansas, Kentucky,   
and Ohio for the highest ROA ratio value (0.010).  
5.2 Panel Unit Root Tests 
 The time-series statistical properties of the 
variables were tested using panel unit root tests. Table 3 
shows the results for the unit root tests. All vari-      
ables are first expressed in logarithmic form in levels 
and tested for panel unit roots. The null hypothesis of 
both tests, Levin, Lin & Chu (2002) and Im, Pesaran 
and Shin (2003), is that the variable has a unit           
root and is non-stationary. The rejection of the null 
implies the variable is stationary in levels form. Based 
on the two-panel unit root tests, log of real C&I     
loans, log of housing price index, and log of credit 
quality were first-differenced to ensure stationarity. 
Next, the estimation model and corresponding results 
are presented. 
VI. Empirical Model 
 Regressions were run using two state-level indi-
cators, real state GDP growth and real personal income 
growth, separately. First, regressions were run using 
real state GDP growth (Equation 1). 
∆ln(C&I loans) = a0 + a1 (Real state-GDP growth)       
+ a2ln(unemployment rates) +a3∆ln(state HPI) + 
a4ln(ROA) +a5∆ln(CreditQuality) + a6ln(Capital-to-
Assets) + a7∆ln(real loan rate)   
      
 (Equation 1) 
Four different model specifications on the aforemen-
tioned estimation equation were used. The first two 
regressions had no fixed effects, with the latter in-
cluding the lagged C&I loans as an explanatory vari-
able (Equation 2) to examine if the lagged value has   
any significant impact on the present period’s value.  
∆ln(C&I loans) = a0 + a1 (Real state-GDP growth)       
+ a2ln(unemployment rates) +a3∆ln(state HPI) + 
a4ln(ROA) +a5∆ln(CreditQuality) + a6ln(Capital-to-
Assets) + a7∆ln(real loan rate) + a8∆ln(C&I loans)t-1
      
 (Equation 2) 
 Next, regressions were run with fixed cross-
sectional and non-fixed period effects, i.e. no yearly 
dummies. Fixed effects are used to account for any 
heterogeneity across states or time that is not ac- 
counted for by the independent variables in the 
regression equation. Lastly, a regression was run with 
both cross-section and period fixed effects, i.e. with 
state and time dummies. Real state GDP growth was 
then replaced with real personal income growth and   
the same four model specifications were used (Equa-
tion 3). Both state GDP growth and personal income 
growth were used in order to explore the best proxy    
for the business cycle. The results section discusses 
which of these was a better proxy as indicated by the 
regression results. 
∆ln(C&I loans) = a0 + a1 (Real Personal Income 
growth) + a2ln(unemployment rates) +a3∆ln(state   
HPI) + a4ln(ROA) +a5∆ln(CreditQuality) + 
a6ln(Capital-to-Assets) + a7∆ln(real loan rate) + 
a8∆ln(C&I loans)t-1  
 (Equation 3) 
The regression results are reported in the following 
section.  
VII. Results 
  The following tables, Tables 4 & 5, display the 
regression results. The results from the regressions    
with the real state GDP growth are shown in Table       
4. The regression results without both state and time 
dummies are labeled Model 1. Model 2 represents the 
regression using neither state nor time dummies, but 
including lagged C&I loans. Model 3 results represent 
the regression with fixed state dummies only. Lastly, 
Model 4 shows results from the regression without     
the real loan rate and lagged C&I loans, but with both 
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state and time dummies.  
 The various regression specifications provided 
robust results in regard to the variables that impact   
C&I loans. The significant variables were log of the     
capital-to-assets ratio, log of bank ROA, state real   
GDP growth, and the growth rate of the log of the     
real loan rate. Model 2, which represents the regres- 
sion where the lagged log of C&I loans growth rates 
were included in the independent variables, shows     
that this variable is significant. The results show that a 
10% increase in a bank’s capital-to-assets ratio will 
result in a decrease in real C&I loans of 1.2%-2.0%. 
When a bank’s ROA increases 10%, real C&I loans 
increase between 0.6%-0.7%. A 10% increase in state 
GDP growth will result in an increase in real C&I   
loans of 6.7%-7.0%. If the real loan rate increases   
10%, real C&I loans will increase 7.4%-7.8%. And, a 
10% increase in real C&I loans in the previous year 
causes an increase in real C&I loans in the current 
period by 0.9%. Interestingly, Model 4, which uses  
both time and state dummies, reports that the real     
state GDP growth is not significant. A plausible 
explanation for this will come later. Thus, it can be 
concluded that bank-specific variables and state GDP 
growth have a significant impact on real C&I loan 
growth.  
 Analyzing the statistical properties of the     
four models, the F-statistics are all significant at the 
99% confidence level. This means that the regres-    
sion equations fit the data well. The R-squares are     
low due to the use of first-differences, especially for   
the dependent variable, real C&I loans. Between the 
four models, their explanatory power ranges between 
9%-25%. The Durbin-Watson statistic, (D-W stat), 
ranges from 1.81-1.97 for all models. This is close to 
the desired value of 2, and means the residuals are      
not autocorrelated. As mentioned, the same regres-   
sion specifications were used, but personal income 
growth was inserted into the equation in the place of 
real state GDP growth. These results are reported in 
Table 5.  
 The results from the regressions with real    
state personal income growth mirror those for real   
state GDP growth. Model 1 represents the regres-     
sion results without both state and time dummies.   
Next, Model 2 shows results from the regression with  
neither state nor time dummies, but with the lagged 
value of real C&I loans. Model 3 results are from the 
regression with state dummies but not time dum-    
mies. And, Model 4 shows the results from the re-
gression without the loan rate and lagged C&I loans,  
but including both state and time dummies.  
 As with the real state GDP growth results, the 
significant variables are log of the capital-to-assets 
ratio, log of bank ROA, state real personal income 
growth, and the growth rate of the log of the real      
loan rate. Model 2, which represents the regression 
where the lagged log of the C&I growth rates were 
included in the independent variables, shows that       
this lagged variable is significant. Model 4 reports     
that the state real personal income growth is not 
significant. Though, overall it can be concluded that 
bank-specific variables and state real personal income 
growth most impact real C&I loans. According to       
the results, when real state personal income is used 
rather than real state GDP growth, a 10% increase in a 
bank’s capital-to-assets ratio will result in a decrease in 
real C&I loans of 1.1%-2.0%. When a bank’s ROA 
increases 10%, real C&I loans increases between   
0.5%-0.7%. A 10% increase in real personal income 
growth will cause real C&I loans to increase between 
11.00%-12.00%. If the real loan rate increases 10%,  
real C&I loans will increase 8.5%-8.9%. Comparing  
the coefficients of real state personal income growth 
with that of real state GDP growth, I found state 
personal income growth to have a larger coefficient. 
This signifies that real C&I loans are more sensitive to 
personal income growth than to state GDP growth.  
  The statistical properties for the regressions 
with personal income growth were very similar to      
the regressions that had state GDP growth that are 
reported in Table 4. The F-statistics were all signifi- 
cant at the 99% confidence level meaning the regres-
sion equations fit the data well. The R-squares are low 
again because of the use of first-differences. Between 
the four models, their explanatory power ranges 
between 10%-25%. The D-W stat ranges from 1.83-
1.96 for all models signifying autocorrelation is not a 
concern.  
 The similar results between the two state-level 
economic indicators are not surprising. First, the neg-
ative coefficient for the capital-to-asset ratio implies 
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banks with a higher capital to asset ratio lend less in 
C&I loans. As mentioned in the introduction, C&I  
loans are some of a bank’s riskiest categories of assets. 
Therefore, as banks become more capitalized, they    
will decrease their lending in C&I loans. The negative 
coefficient also implies banks in the Midwest are risk-
averse and invest in other, safer forms of assets rather 
than C&I loans. The next significant variable is credit 
quality. A rise in credit quality means a deterioration   
of banks’ asset quality. When the quality of a bank’s 
credit falls, banks increase their engagement in risky 
lending practices. The other bank-specific variable    
that is significant is ROA. This follows, because as 
bank’s profits rise, banks fund more C&I loans.  
 The non-bank specific significant variable is  
the real interest rate. As the interest rate that banks 
charge on loans adjusted for inflation rises, banks are 
incentivized to make more loans due to higher real 
returns on loans. This is in accord with the loanable 
funds theory. According to the theory, as the interest 
rate rises, the supply of loanable funds rises.              
The positive and significant effect of both real state 
GDP growth and real personal income growth im-   
plies C&I lending in the Midwest is procyclical in na-
ture. As the Midwest experiences an economic boom, 
both real state GDP growth and real personal income 
growth rise, which in turn raises C&I loans.   
 The other variables, state HPI and unemploy-
ment rate, were not significant. The state HPI may     
not have proven significant in my research, as it is a 
measure of residential house values. So, while a rise    
or fall in the HPI may signal an economic expan-      
sion or recession, the direct impact of this will most 
likely not be seen in real C&I loans, but rather in real 
estate loans. The next insignificant variable is the state 
unemployment rate. Changes in the unemployment   
rates will most likely not have an effect on C&I loans. 
Instead, because unemployment has a more direct 
impact on individuals, unemployment rates will most 
likely impact loans to individuals (such as auto loans) 
made by banks .  
 Lastly, as noted, both real state GDP growth 
and real personal income growth were insignificant in 
the regression with both state and time fixed dummy 
variables. This is because the number of state dum-
mies, (10), are far less than the number of year dum- 
mies. And, the large number of year dummies in the 
sample of 368 observations affects the state real GDP 
growth rates and makes them insignificant. Because 
growth rates themselves are correlated with time, the 
fixed time dummies make both of these variables 
insignificant.  
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 C&I loans are among the riskiest loans that 
banks make. This is simply because one can never       
be certain of how successful a business will be, and 
thus, whether or not it will be able to pay off its       
loan. This research aimed to examine the impacts         
of regional economic cycles and the health of com-
mercial banks on real C&I loans in the Midwest. To 
study these relationships, regressions were run using 
two state-level indicators: real state GDP growth       
and real personal income growth. Several other state 
economic and banking industry variables were used     
as well. The significant variables identified in my 
regressions were the same regardless of which state-
level indicator was used. 
 The results show that the main variables    
which impact real C&I loans are bank profits, the      
real loan rate, real state GDP growth, personal     
income growth, and the capital-to-assets ratio. Real   
C&I loans in the Midwest are increased by increas-    
ing bank profits (ROA). Likewise, an increase in the 
lending rate, the state GDP growth rate or per-        
sonal income growth rate, or a decrease in a bank’s 
capital-to-asset ratio will also significantly increase   
C&I loans. Moreover, I found real personal income 
growth to have a greater impact on C&I loans than    
state GDP growth. A 10% increase in real personal 
income results in an 11%-12% increase in real C&I 
loans, while a 10% increase in real state GDP growth 
only causes a 6.70%-7.00% increase in real C&I     
loans.  
 A policy that has had an impact on C&I    
lending is the Dodd-Frank Act, which began in        
2010. It has caused a general increase in banks’      
capital-to-assets ratios since its enactment. The      
Dodd-Frank Act inserted new requirements, which 
demanded banks to spend more time and resources 
ensuring they are following proper documentation and 
reporting standards. This extra push for proper    
banking also discourages banks from engaging in 
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risky lending behaviors, like lending more C&I loans, 
which occurred prior to the financial crisis. A decrease 
in risky behavior leads banks to be more risk-averse, 
and practice safer lending practices. So, the Dodd- 
Frank Act provides some explanation for the current 
decrease in C&I loans. My research also provides   
some explanations as to the banking industry’s situa-
tion during the recent financial crisis.  
 During the crisis, banks were flooded with 
liquidity by the US Federal Reserve Board. This liquid-
ity allowed banks to be more capitalized. As the results 
show, the coefficient for capital-to-assets ratio is nega-
tive and significant. Therefore, the additional liquidity 
caused a decrease in risky C&I loans. Banks in the 
Midwest were operating over cautiously and ignoring 
potential income earning investment opportunities by 
making fewer C&I loans and investing in more capital. 
In regard to the overall banking sector, the results show 
that for commercial banks in the Midwest, it is 
imperative that banks’ profits rise for them to give out 
more C&I loans to businesses. Moreover, the positive 
coefficient for real state GDP growth and real personal 
income growth imply real C&I loans are procyclical to 
regional economic activity.  
 Overall, my research proved quite conclusive  
as to what regional economic indicators and bank-
specific variables have an impact on real C&I loans. 
Some areas of future research are to expand this study 
to include all 50 states and the District of Colum-      
bia. The focus of this research was on 10 states in the 
Midwest region, but adding in the remaining 40 states 
would allow one to draw more conclusive results in 
regard to the United States’ entire banking industry. A 
second avenue for future research is to include other 
types of loans that commercial banks make aside     
from C&I loans. The other types of loans banks make 
are agricultural loans, loans to individuals, and real 
estate loans. Including all loan types will enable one    
to provide a comparative prospective by comparing    
the sensitivity of each category of loans to state GDP 
growth and personal income growth. Adding loans to 
individuals would most likely cause the state unem-
ployment rate to be significant, because the amount     
of loans made to individuals is heavily dependent on 
one’s income and employment. Likewise, state HPI is 
likely to have a significant impact on real estate loans. 
A third variable to control for in future research is 
whether or not a bank is a single-market or multi-  
market bank. As mentioned in Section II, scholars 
suggest these banks will react differently to changes     
in regional economic conditions. Distinguishing 
between the two and comparing the results is an-     
other way to examine the banking sector in another 
way. These courses of future research will allow one     
to draw more complete results that more wholly 
represent commercial bank lending throughout the 
United States. 
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Assets 
State HPI Unemployment 
Rate 
State Real 
GDP 
Growth 
State Real 
Personal 
Income 
Illinois 65,941,985.39 
 
0.007 0.007 
 
0.076 
 
208.466 
 
7.087 
 
1.620 
 
1.734 
 
Indiana 10,565,238.14 
 
0.009 
 
0.005 
 
0.082 
 
170.818 
 
6.234 
 
1.846 
 
1.905 
 
Iowa 5,794,521.93 
 
0.009 
 
0.005 
 
0.087 
 
159.529 
 
4.808 
 
1.956 
 
1.913 
 
Kansas 5,521,575.34 
 
0.010 
 
0.007 
 
0.089 
 
155.470 
 
4.805 
 
2.242 
 
2.235 
 
Kentucky 6,420,949.59 
 
0.010 
 
0.005 
 
0.084 
 
184.569 
 
6.997 
 
2.065 
 
2.466 
 
Michigan 26,388,993.76 
 
0.008 
 
0.006 
 
0.078 
 
185.825 
 
8.313 
 
1.092 
 
1.491 
 
Minnesota 14,906,118.64 
 
0.009 
 
0.006 
 
0.077 
 
198.069 
 
5.034 
 
2.623 
 
2.673 
 
Missouri 12,762,458.50 
 
0.009 
 
0.006 
 
0.081 
 
182.374 
 
6.016 
 
1.886 
 
2.014 
 
Ohio 70,899,037.52 
 
0.010 
 
0.008 
 
0.078 
 
174.852 
 
6.903 
 
1.464 
 
1.589 
 
Wisconsin 12,781,725.50 
 
0.008 
 
0.005 
 
0.081 
 
189.967 
 
5.603 
 
2.040 
 
2.220 
 
Figure 3: Bank Return on Assets for All States 
Table 2: Average Values for Variables by State 
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		 Levels	 		 1st	differenced	 		
Variable	
Levin,	Lin	&	
Chu	t‐stat	
Im,	Pesaran	and	
Shin	W‐stat	
Levin,	Lin	&	
Chu	t	
Im,	Pesaran	and	
Shin	W‐stat	
Log	of	real	C&	I	Loans	 ‐0.222	 0.979	 ‐8.003***	 ‐9.852***	
Log	of	Return	on	Assets	(ROA)	 ‐1.284*	 ‐2.336***	 ‐7.137***	 ‐9.918***	
Log	of	Housing	Price	Index	(HPI)	 ‐1.426*	 ‐0.894	 ‐2.534***	 ‐4.356***	
Log	of	Unemployment	Rate	 ‐1.533*	 ‐1.301*	 ‐8.144***	 ‐6.401***	
Log	of	Credit	Quality	 0.360	 ‐2.869***	 ‐6.778***	 ‐5.448***	
Log	of	Capital‐to‐Assets	Ratio	 ‐3.153***	 ‐1.507*	 ‐13.369***	 ‐14.023***	
State	real	GDP	Growth		 ‐11.219***	 ‐10.128***	 ‐11.673***	 ‐19.770***	
Log	of	real	Loan	Rate	
State	real	Personal	Income	Growth	
2.823
‐1.650**	
0.277
‐2.302**	
3.686	
‐13.852***	
11.888***
‐11.440***	
*	Denote	rejecting	the	null	hypothesis	of	unit	root	process.	***	=	at	the	1%	level,	**	=	at	the	5%	level,	and	*	=	at	the	
10%	level.	
  Model 1                   Model 2                   Model 3                      Model 4 
c -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.11 
(-0.24) (-0.10) (-0.26) (-0.36) 
∆log(Credit quality) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.07*** 
(1.27) (1.11) (1.27) (2.80) 
log(Capital-to-Assets) -0.13* -0.12** -0.12** -0.20* 
(-2.44) (-2.15) (-2.14) (-1.92) 
log(Return on Assets) 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07** 
(2.96) (2.91) (2.40) (2.37) 
State real GDP growth 0.67*** 0.68*** 0.70*** -0.10 
(2.86) (2.87) (2.93) (-0.20) 
log (Unemployment rates) 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 
(0.04) (0.24) (-0.19) (-0.36) 
∆log(HPI) 0.00 0.01 0.05 -0.11 
(0.01) (0.04) (0.21) (-0.36) 
∆log(real loan rate) 0.74* 0.77* 0.78* 
(1.66) (1.73) (1.74) 
∆log(real C&I loans)t-1 0.09* 
(1.62) 
State dummies No No Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No No Yes 
N 368 368 368 368 
R2 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.25 
F-Stat 5.13*** 4.84*** 2.72*** 1.99*** 
D-W stat 1.81 1.97 1.86 1.94 
*	Denote	rejecting	the	null	hypothesis	of	insignificance.	***	=	at	the	1%	level,	**	=	at	the	5%	level,	and	*	=	at	the	
10%	level.	Terms	in	brackets	denote	the	t‐stats.	
Table	3:	Panel	Unit	Root	Tests	
Table 4: Results for GDP Growth 
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  Model 1                 Model 2                  Model 3                Model 4 
c -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.11 
(-0.32) (-0.18) (-0.33) (-0.37) 
∆log(Credit quality) 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.07*** 
(0.96) (0.80) (0.98) (2.83) 
log(Capital-to-Assets) -0.12** -0.11** -0.11** -0.20* 
(-2.30) (-2.05) (-1.98) (-1.88) 
log(Return on Assets) 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05** 0.07** 
(2.89) (2.84) (2.34) (2.33) 
State real Personal Income 
growth 1.13*** 1.10*** 1.21*** 0.04 
(3.40) (3.31) (3.61) (0.06) 
log (Unemployment rates) 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 
(0.28) (0.43) (0.08) (-0.32) 
∆log(HPI) 0.01 0.02 0.06 -0.12 
(0.06) (0.10) (0.27) (-0.40) 
∆log(real loan rate) 0.85* 0.88** 0.89** 
(1.91) (1.97) (2.00) 
∆log(real C&I loans)t-1 0.07 
(1.39) 
State dummies No No Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No No Yes 
N 368 368 368 368 
R2 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.25 
F-stat 5.66*** 5.20*** 3.02*** 1.99*** 
D-W stat 1.83 1.96 1.88 1.95 
*	Denote	rejecting	the	null	hypothesis	of	insignificance.	***	=	at	the	1%	level,	**	=	at	the	5%	level,	and	*	=	at	the	
10%	level.	Terms	in	brackets	denote	the	t‐stats.	
 
Table 5: Results for Real Personal Income 
